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Abstract
Prospective memory (PM) involves remembering intended actions in the future, such as posting a letter when seeing a post 
box (event-based PM) or making a phone call at 2:00 pm (time-based PM). Studies on aging and PM have often reported 
negative age effects in the laboratory, but positive age effects in naturalistic tasks outside the laboratory (the so-called 
age–PM-paradox). The present study re-examined this pattern of the paradox by studying, for the first time, age differences 
in time- and event-based PM in lab-based, experimenter-generated naturalistic and self-assigned real-life PM tasks within 
the same sample of young and older adults. Results showed that differential age effects in and outside the laboratory were 
qualified by the type of PM cue. While age-related deficits were obtained for laboratory event-based tasks, no age effect was 
obtained for naturalistic event-based PM. Age benefits in the field were only observed for naturalistic time-based tasks, but 
not for participants’ own self-assigned time-based tasks. These findings indicate that the age benefits for naturalistic PM 
tasks may have been overestimated due to the dominant use of experimenter-generated naturalistic time-based PM tasks in 
previous studies. Therefore, the precise pattern of the age–PM-paradox may need redefining as mostly consisting of negative 
age effects in lab-based PM tasks and mostly the absence of negative age effects (rather than age benefits) in naturalistic and 
self-assigned tasks outside the laboratory.
Introduction
Remembering to take one’s medication, pay a bill on time 
or send a birthday card to a friend are all examples of pro-
spective memory (PM) tasks, which involve self-initiated 
retrieval of intended actions at a specific moment in the 
future (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; Kliegel, McDaniel, & 
Einstein, 2007). They are often contrasted with retrospec-
tive memory tasks, which involve the externally prompted 
retrieval of past information such as the recall of previously 
studied words in a free recall test or someone’s name when 
meeting them for the second time. Another important feature 
of PM tasks, in addition to their self-initiated nature, is that 
they have to be performed when one is occupied with a com-
peting activity at the same time, the so-called ongoing task 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). PM tasks can be classified as 
event-based tasks, in which the execution of the intended 
action is initiated in response to a particular target event 
or cue (e.g., posting a letter when passing a post box), or 
time-based tasks, which require remembering to perform the 
intended action at a specific time or after a specified period 
of time has elapsed (e.g., making a phone call at 2:00 pm, 
taking the cake out of the oven after 40 min). PM has been 
identified as one of the most frequent everyday memory 
challenges (Kliegel & Martin, 2003), and given the impact 
that PM can have on older adults’ instrumental activities 
in everyday life (Woods, Weinborn, Velnoweth, Rooney, & 
Bucks, 2012), many studies have focused on the exploration 
of possible age effects on PM.
One of the most surprising and perplexing findings that 
have emerged from this research concerns a contrasting pat-
tern of age-related PM performance in different task set-
tings: While age-related deficits are often found in standard 
lab-based PM tasks, age-related benefits occur in naturalistic 
 * Katharina M. Schnitzspahn 
 Katharina.Schnitzspahn@abdn.ac.uk
1 School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, 
Aberdeen AB24 3FX, UK
2 Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, 
Hatfield, UK
3 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
 Psychological Research
1 3
PM tasks, with older adults outperforming young partici-
pants (Kliegel, Rendell, & Altgassen, 2008; Phillips, Henry, 
& Martin 2008). Lab-based studies usually involve a dual-
task paradigm consisting of an ongoing activity (e.g., lexi-
cal decision task) that needs to be interrupted to carry out 
an additional PM task (e.g., press a key when a particular 
word occurs or at a specific point in time during the ongo-
ing task; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Typical naturalis-
tic PM tasks comprise tasks such as mailing a postcard to 
the experimenter (e.g., Patton & Meit, 1993) or calling the 
experimenter at pre-defined times (e.g., Maylor, 1990). The 
everyday activities that participants are engaged in, when 
the right moment to perform the naturalistic PM task arises 
(e.g., walking down the street or reading a newspaper, 
respectively), represent ongoing activities equivalent to the 
ongoing task in the laboratory. As in the laboratory, these 
ongoing activities may vary in the amount of attentional 
resources required.
The pattern of differential age effects observed in PM as 
a function of the task setting has been called the age–PM-
paradox (Rendell & Craik, 2000), and it currently constitutes 
“one of the most important puzzles in the study of cognitive 
aging” (p. 3, Verhaegen, Martin, & Sedek, 2012). The posi-
tive age effects outside the laboratory are puzzling, because 
they are counterintuitive and contradict theories of cognitive 
aging, which would at best predict absence of age effects for 
those naturalistic PM tasks that may be mediated by auto-
matic retrieval processes due to strong external environmen-
tal support and/or relying on some compensatory strategies 
(e.g., Craik, 1986; Grady & Craik, 2000; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988). Similarly, positive age effects would not be predicted 
by the influential multiprocess theory of PM, which assumes 
that PM performance can be mediated by both automatic and 
strategic monitoring processes, depending on the context 
and task requirements (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007; 
Scullin, McDaniel, & Shelton, 2013). Thus, although many 
short-delay laboratory PM tasks require strategic monitor-
ing for the target events or times, which may be accounting 
for negative age effects, in everyday situations such con-
stant monitoring would be unrealistic and unnecessary over 
longer delay periods of hours or days, and people would be 
more likely to rely on spontaneous retrieval processes (cf. 
Scullin et al., 2013). If this was the case (for initial evidence 
see Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 
2007; Sellen, Louie, Harris, & Wilkins, 1997), then the 
multiprocess theory would predict absence of age effects in 
everyday PM tasks, but not positive age effects reported by 
naturalistic studies (Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; 
Moscovitch, 2008; Rendell & Thomson, 1993, 1999).
Research on the age–PM-paradox is important not only 
theoretically (as it can enhance or even change our under-
standing of cognitive aging), but also because it raises the 
intriguing possibility that PM performance may be one of 
the few cognitive abilities that may be spared by negative 
effects of aging in everyday life (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, 
& Crawford, 2004; Phillips et al., 2008). Real-life PM tasks 
are intentions that participants set up themselves without 
interference of an experimenter (i.e., actual intentions par-
ticipants form, try to remember and fulfill at specific times 
or events). Most studies on the age-PM-paradox have used 
naturalistic tasks that were more or less artificial and exter-
nally assigned by an experimenter. It is therefore essential to 
determine whether findings from studies with experimenter 
assigned ‘naturalistic’ PM tasks generalize to remembering 
actual real-life PM tasks formed by participants themselves 
in the course of their daily life.
Although the age–PM-paradox has been confirmed by 
two meta-analyses of earlier studies (Henry et al., 2004; Uttl, 
2008), research in this area is still in its infancy, despite its 
huge theoretical and practical implications. First, the cur-
rent formulation of the paradox has been based primarily 
on separate studies that have tested PM in the laboratory 
(using predominantly event-based tasks), or in everyday 
life using primarily naturalistic time-based tasks (e.g., see 
Henry et al., 2004). Second, only a handful of studies have 
tested the same samples of young and older adults in and 
outside the laboratory (Kvavilashvili, Cockburn, & Korn-
brot, 2013; Niedźwieńska & Barzykowski, 2012; Rendell 
& Craik, 20001; Rendell & Thomson, 1999; Schnitzspahn, 
Ihle, Henry, Rendell, & Kliegel, 2011), and out of these, 
only two have tested both time-and-event-based tasks 
within the single study (Niedźwieńska & Barzykowski, 
2012; Rendell & Craik, 2000). Third, four studies inves-
tigated age effects on real-life PM tasks formed by partici-
pants themselves, but they did not assess participants’ PM 
performance in and outside the laboratory with standard 
experimenter-assigned laboratory and naturalistic tasks 
to provide comparisons across settings and types of tasks 
(Freeman & Ellis, 2003; Ihle, Schnitzspahn, Rendell, Luong, 
& Kliegel, 2012; Niedźwieńska, Janik, & Jarczynska, 2013; 
Schnitzspahn et al., 2016). Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, while positive age effects have been relatively consist-
ently obtained for time-based tasks outside the laboratory, 
inconsistent patterns have been obtained in those few stud-
ies that have used naturalistic event-based tasks (see details 
below). Taken together, the nature of the age–PM-paradox 
is far from clear and calls for more focussed and systematic 
investigation.
The study of the age–PM-paradox is becoming espe-
cially important in the light of accumulating evidence which 
1 Note that in the Rendell and Craik (2000) study, only old partici-
pants (young-old and old-old) completed both laboratory and natural-
istic PM tasks (in study 1 and 2, respectively), while separate groups 
of young adults were recruited for study 1 and 2.
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shows that the typical pattern often cited in the literature, 
with negative age effects in the lab and positive age effects 
outside the lab, may not be entirely accurate and may need 
careful re-examination using a within-subjects design. Con-
sequently, the primary goal of the present investigation was 
to make significant advances in research on the age–PM-
paradox by establishing the precise pattern of age effects for 
all three types of tasks (laboratory, naturalistic experimenter-
assigned, and real-life self-assigned PM tasks) within the 
same sample of young and older adults, while manipulating 
the type of PM cue (time vs. event) in and outside the labora-
tory. None of the previous studies have tested all three types 
of PM tasks within one experiment and only two studies 
compared event-based and time-based PM in and outside the 
laboratory within one sample of young and older adults with 
conflicting results concerning the effects of age on naturalis-
tic event-based tasks (Niedźwieńska & Barzykowski, 2012; 
Rendell & Craik, 2000).
The age–PM‑paradox for time‑based tasks
Time-based PM tasks have been studied in the laboratory 
either with computerised ongoing tasks where participants 
have to remember to press a key once every few minutes 
(e.g., 2–5 min, depending on the study; Einstein, McDaniel, 
Richardson, Guynn, & Cunfer, 1995; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, 
Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997) or by asking participants to note 
when a particular amount of time has elapsed from the start 
of the session (e.g., 10 and 20 min) involving several differ-
ent cognitive tasks (both paper-and-pencil and computer-
ised). In the former, participants can check the elapsed time 
by pressing another computer key, which brings a digital 
clock onto the screen for few seconds, and in the latter, par-
ticipants often can check a real clock on the wall or a table 
nearby. Performance is usually measured by the proportion 
of on-time responses, with varying time-windows used in 
different studies for counting a response as on time (from 
few seconds to 60 s).
Because participants have to remember to check the 
clock themselves without the help of any external cues, 
the widely held theoretical view is that remembering time-
based tasks is more effortful than remembering event-
based tasks (Einstein et al., 1995; McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007). Therefore, larger age effects are expected for time- 
than event-based tasks, and overall, negative age effects 
on-time-based PM tasks have indeed been demonstrated 
in several studies (e.g., Einstein et al., 1995; Kvavilas-
hvili, Kornbrot, Mash, Cockburn, & Milne, 2009; Park 
et al., 1997; Rose, Rendell, McDaniel, Aberle, & Kliegel, 
2010). However, there are also studies that have failed 
to obtain negative age effects on laboratory time-based 
tasks (e.g., d’Ydewalle, Luwel, & Brunfaut, 1999; Logie, 
Maylor, Della Salla, & Smith, 2004; Niedźwieńska & Bar-
zykowski, 2012), which suggests that the current theoreti-
cal understanding of time-based PM, as based primarily 
on effortful monitoring processes, may be oversimplified 
or incorrect (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007; for more 
detailed discussion of possible reasons for the absence of 
age effects in some laboratory tasks of time-based PM, see 
“Discussion” section).
In naturalistic studies of time-based PM, participants 
are usually asked to remember to carry out simple tasks 
such as sending a postcard, a text message, making a phone 
call or operating an electronic device at regular intervals 
(sometimes several times a day) over a time period of sev-
eral days. In contrast to negative age effects that are often 
obtained in the laboratory, almost all naturalistic studies of 
time-based PM have reported significant positive age effects 
(Devolder et al., 1990; Moscovitch, 1982; Niedźwieńska & 
Barzykowski, 2012; Patton & Meit, 1993; Rendell & Craik, 
2000; Rendell & Thomson, 1993, 1999; Schnitzspahn et al., 
2011), a pattern that was also confirmed by the Henry et al. 
(2004) meta-analysis.
Three of these studies have used the same participants in 
and outside the laboratory (Niedźwieńska & Barzykowski, 
2012; Rendell & Thomson, 1999; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011). 
The initial study by Rendell and Thomson (1999) with large 
samples of young, young–old and old–old participants used a 
variety of time schedules (some of them quite complex), but 
these manipulations did not affect the results (both groups of 
older adults outperformed the young). One potential limita-
tion of the study by Rendell and Thomson (1999) was that 
a proportion of younger adults was admitting being unable 
to operate a device due to occasionally leaving it behind, 
which did not happen to older adults. However, more recent 
studies, which have used participants’ own mobile phones 
(which people rarely leave behind) still fully confirmed the 
validity of initial findings and older adults’ superiority in 
carrying out time-based PM tasks (Niedźwieńska & Bar-
zykowski, 2012; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, some naturalistic studies of time-based PM 
have failed to obtain age benefits and have instead reported 
no reliable age effects. Closer examination of these stud-
ies indicates that they involved single, one-off tasks rather 
than carrying out the same action many times over several 
days. For example, in a study by Kvavilashvili and Fisher 
(2007), young and older participants met with a researcher 
on Monday morning and had to remember to make a single 
phone call to the researcher at their chosen time on Sunday 
(after 6 days). Similarly, in a study by West (1988, study 1), 
participants had to send a postcard 2 days after an interview 
with a researcher. Arguably, such tasks are more similar to 
real-life time-based PM tasks, which rarely involve carry-
ing out the same action at a particular time over many days 
(except, for instance, when on antibiotic treatment).
 Psychological Research
1 3
Taken together, these initial findings suggest that the posi-
tive age effects in naturalistic time-based tasks may have been, 
at least partly, due to using a particular type of time-based 
task, which involves repeatedly carrying out the same action 
at specific times over a period of time. This conjecture will 
be investigated in the present study by asking participants to 
carry out only one-off time-based tasks rather than repeated 
time-based tasks as in most previous studies.
The age–PM‑paradox for event‑based tasks
Although most laboratory research on PM is being con-
ducted on event-based PM, there are only a handful of stud-
ies that have investigated event-based PM outside the labo-
ratory, probably due to difficulties in designing naturalistic 
event-based tasks (cf. Phillips et al., 2008). Moreover, so 
far only Rendell and Craik (2000) have reported positive 
age effects for naturalistic event-based tasks, while the three 
studies that assessed the paradox for event-based tasks in 
one sample of young and older adults resulted in either no 
age effects (Kvavilashvili et al., 2013; Niedźwieńska & Bar-
zykowski, 2012) or a negative age effect with young adults 
performing better than old–old participants (Dobbs & Rule, 
1987; see also Bailey, Henry, Rendell, Phillips, & Kliegel, 
2010). In addition, while participants in the Niedźwieńska 
and Barzykowski (2012) study had to remember to execute 
an event-based task on several occasions (as in most natural-
istic time-based PM tasks), participants in the Kvavilashvili 
et al. (2013) study had to complete only a single task by 
putting their name and the date on a front page of a ques-
tionnaire after filling it in at home and posting it back to 
the researcher (a task used originally by Dobbs & Rule, 
1987). As no age effects were obtained in both studies, 
it is less likely that the absence of the positive age effect 
depended on the nature of the task (single-occasion vs. 
multiple-occasion).
Consequently, available evidence on naturalistic event-
based PM is mixed and does not support a current formula-
tion of the age–PM-paradox, which emphasises the presence 
of positive age effects for naturalistic PM tasks outside the 
laboratory. More balanced conclusions could be achieved if 
studies on the paradox started including event-based tasks 
into their design. Therefore, in the present study, participants 
had to carry out two different naturalistic event-based tasks 
after completing the laboratory session.
Effects of age on real‑life self‑assigned PM 
tasks
Four studies have investigated age differences in actual 
real-life PM behaviour by asking participants to list their 
intended PM tasks for a given time period (e.g., the next day 
or week), and indicate which tasks were completed and for-
gotten (or re-prioritised) at the end of this time period (Free-
man & Ellis, 2003; Ihle et al., 2012; Niedźwieńska et al., 
2013; Schnitzspahn et al., 2016). Although these studies 
have reported positive age effects in real-life PM task com-
pletion, they have also shown that on average, older adults 
gave higher ratings of intention importance (Ihle et al., 2012; 
Niedźwieńska et al., 2013; Schnitzspahn et al., 2016) and 
displayed the tendency to form well-planned intentions with 
more contextual details than young adults (Niedźwieńska 
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, importance and intention speci-
ficity cannot entirely explain the positive age effects obtained 
in these studies. Although positive age effects indeed dis-
appeared when young and older participants’ PM perfor-
mance was compared for important or well-defined inten-
tions (based on participants’ own ratings), they were still 
present for less important (Ihle et al., 2012; Niedźwieńska 
et al., 2013) and less specific intentions (Niedźwieńska et al., 
2013). Overall, these findings suggest that possible media-
tors of age differences exist and that in everyday life, young 
adults can perform as well as older adults under certain con-
ditions (see also Aberle, Rendell, Rose, Kliegel, & McDan-
iel, 2010). Therefore, more evidence is needed before one 
can make strong claims that, in general, older adults outper-
form young adults when remembering their own rather than 
experimenter-generated PM tasks in everyday life.
The present study
The literature reviewed in previous sections indicates that 
despite initial progress in demonstrating the age–PM-par-
adox, there are several unanswered questions not only in 
terms of the exact pattern of the paradox for laboratory and 
naturalistic time-and event-based PM tasks, but also in terms 
of whether positive age effects on naturalistic time-based 
tasks generalize to participants’ own self-assigned real-life 
intentions. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to 
clarify the precise pattern of age-related decrements in the 
laboratory and age-related benefits in both naturalistic and 
real-life self-assigned PM tasks as a function of PM cue 
type (time vs. event) within one sample of young and older 
participants.
In the laboratory, participants were given two differ-
ent event-based tasks and one time-based task while being 
engaged in completing several different cognitive tasks and 
questionnaires. In everyday life, participants had to remem-
ber to carry out two single event-based tasks, and two dif-
ferent time-based tasks (text message and phone call), which 
varied in terms of time delay (1-day delay vs. 3-day delay). 
These single-occasion rather than repetitive (multiple occa-
sion) time-based tasks were chosen to examine the idea that 
positive age effects may be less likely to occur with such 
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single-occasion tasks (cf. Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). In 
addition, participants were asked to list their own PM tasks 
that they intended to perform in the next few days, and later 
their performance success on these tasks was assessed. To 
explore if the type of cue in self-assigned PM tasks showed 
the same pattern of age effects as in naturalistic tasks, all 
reported intentions were categorized post-hoc, based on par-
ticipants’ indication of a time or event related to the inten-
tion fulfillment.
The main prediction was that the standard pattern of the 
age–PM-paradox would be obtained for time-based but not 
for event-based tasks. While in the laboratory, negative age 
effects were predicted, outside the laboratory positive age 
effects were expected only for naturalistic time-based but 
not for event-based tasks. However, if positive age effects 
on-time-based tasks in previous research were due to using 
repetitive rather than single-occasion (one-off) time-based 
tasks, then no positive age effect would be expected for sin-
gle-occasion-time-based tasks used in the present study. In 
relation to self-assigned PM tasks, it was expected that the 
pattern of findings would mimic the one obtained for natu-
ralistic PM tasks with no age effects for event- but positive 
age effects for time-based tasks.
In addition to studying the pattern of the age–PM-
paradox, we also examined two variables that have been 
often discussed in the literature as potentially important 
for explaining positive age effects outside the laboratory 
(Phillips et al., 2008). First, participants had to rate the 
importance of naturalistic PM tasks as well as of the self-
assigned PM tasks. Perceived task importance has been sug-
gested as one key motivational variable that can increase 
PM, and potentially explain age benefits in everyday life by 
differences in perceived importance of intentions between 
young and older adults (Phillips et al., 2008). If this was 
the case, then older adults would rate PM tasks for which 
age benefits were expected in the present study (i.e., time-
based naturalistic and self-assigned tasks) as more impor-
tant than young adults (cf. Ihle et al., 2012; Niedźwieńska 
et al., 2013; Schnitzspahn et al., 2016). Second, participants 
also reported whether they had used any reminders or strate-
gies to carry out PM tasks in everyday life. One of the most 
popular explanations of the age–PM-paradox in the literature 
is that older adults are very good at using external reminders 
in everyday life, while they do not have this opportunity in 
lab-based tasks (Phillips et al., 2008). In the present study, 
we focused on possible differences in the use of reminders 
in naturalistic time- and event-based PM tasks to test the 
hypothesis that the expected age benefits in time-based tasks 
could be explained by a higher number of reminders used by 
older adults for this specific task type.
Method
Participants
The sample included 53 adults, 31 young (Mage = 23.71 years, 
SD = 3.07 years, age range 20–29 years; 12 men) and 22 
older adults (Mage = 67.09 years, SD = 4.66 years, age range 
60–75 years; 12 men). All young adults were undergraduate 
students from the local university who participated in 
exchange for partial course credit. All older adults were vol-
unteers who were recruited using the participant pool from 
the developmental psychology chair in Dresden. Exclusion 
criteria were current physical and mental health and sensory 
problems including hearing or vision impairments. Age 
groups did not differ with respect to gender distribution, 
χ2(df = 1) = 1.30, p = .28, or the mean number of years in 
education, F(1, 51) = .31, p = .58, 휂2
p
 = .006 (Young 
M = 12.45, SD = 1.29; Old M = 12.23, SD = 1.63).
Typical age-related patterns were obtained in relation to 
general cognitive abilities and standard episodic memory tests 
(see Table 1). While older adults attained significantly higher 
scores than young adults on a German vocabulary test (MWT-
B; Lehrl, 2005) measuring crystallized intelligence, young 
adults outperformed older adults on the Digit-Symbol-subtask 
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 
2008) measuring fluid intelligence. In addition, young adults 
also outperformed older adults in immediate and delayed ret-
rospective memory recall (measured with the Verbal Paired 
Associates subtask from the Wechsler Memory Scale revised; 
WMS-R, Wechsler & Härting, 2000). Similarly, there was a 
trend for better performance in young compared to older adults 
Table 1  Mean performance 
scores (standard deviations) on 
cognitive tasks as a function of 
age (young vs. old) and results 
of one-way ANOVAs on these 
means
Cognitive task Age group
Young Old F (1, 51) p 휂2
p
M (SD) M (SD)
Vocabulary 30.71 (2.60) 33.50 (1.95) 18.13 < .001 .26
Digit-symbol 84.77 (11.45) 62.59 (11.67) 23.80 < .001 .48
Verbal paired associates 29.84 (1.59) 27.05 (3.48) 15.46 < .001 .23
Logical memory 56.74 (15.77) 49.09 (12.60) 3.56 .065 .07
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in immediate and delayed performance in the logical memory 




Two tasks were used to measure event-based PM in the 
laboratory. In the pencil task, adapted from Dobbs and Rule 
(1987), participants were asked to repeat the words “blue 
pen” whenever the experimenter used these words during 
the testing session. This occurred on three occasions when 
participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire or com-
plete a test with the blue pen, which was on the desk in 
front of the participant next to another pen of a different 
color. For the token task, adapted from Zeintl, Kliegel, and 
Hofer (2007), participants were asked to take a token out 
of a drawer and give it to the experimenter whenever the 
experimenter started the instruction of a new task with the 
sentence, “The next task concerns memory”. During the test-
ing session, this particular sentence was clearly articulated 
by the experimenter on three occasions. No potentially mis-
leading lure phrases were given. The drawer containing the 
tokens was part of a storage container placed underneath the 
desk. The number of tokens in the drawer was higher than 
the number of cues.
Time-based PM
A modified version of the stop-clock task was used to meas-
ure time-based PM in the laboratory (Rendell & Thomson, 
1999). Participants were asked to remember to tell the 
experimenter when 10 and 20 min had passed immediately 
after the experimenter had finished instructions for all the 
laboratory PM tasks. A small table clock was placed behind 
the participant to enable them to monitor the elapsed time 
by turning around (cf. Harris & Wilkins, 1982). The clock 
was placed in a way that allowed the experimenter to easily 
monitor it and notice the start time. In line with previous 
studies, a time-window of 10 s before and after the target 
time was used to classify responses as correct PM answers 
(e.g., Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001; Rendell 
& Thomson, 1999).
Naturalistic experimenter‑assigned PM tasks
Event-based PM
Participants were instructed to remember to send a text mes-
sage to the experimenter when they saw a public transport 
bus for the first time on the day following the laboratory 
session, reporting the bus line and the participant code. 
Responses were classified as correct when the text message 
was received on the correct day containing an existing bus 
number and the participant code. As a second task, partici-
pants were given a postcard at the end of the laboratory 
session and asked to remember to send it back to the experi-
menter 2 days after the session when they passed a post box 
(Patton & Meit, 1993). They were asked to write down their 
participant code and the date on which they put the card into 
the post box before sending it off. Responses were classified 
as correct if the card arrived at the University with the cor-
rect date and code written on it. Further, the postmark was 
checked and had to be from the agreed date or the following 
weekday.
Time-based PM
In the 1-day delay time-based naturalistic task, participants 
were asked during the laboratory session to send a text mes-
sage containing their participant code to the experimenter at 
an agreed time on the following day. At the end of a phone 
call 3 days later, the experimenter and the participant agreed 
on a new time for a second text message the day after.
In the 3-day delay time-based naturalistic task, partici-
pants were instructed to remember to call the experimenter 
3 days after the laboratory session at a specific time. At the 
end of this phone call, the experimenter and the participant 
agreed on a new time for a second telephone call 3 days later. 
Calls and messages up to 10 min before or after the agreed 
times were classified as correct PM answers.
Real‑life self‑assigned PM tasks
At the end of the laboratory testing session, participants 
were asked to report up to seven intended activities that they 
had planned for the following 3 days. It was stressed that 
participants should not report routine tasks such as mak-
ing one’s bed in the morning, but instead currently intended 
actions (e.g., calling the doctor to make an appointment). 
For each nominated plan, they were also given an option to 
indicate a particular date or time that they had in mind for 
carrying out the task. Further, they had to rate how impor-
tant the intention was on a three-point Likert-scale (1 = less 
important, 2 = important, 3 = very important). Participants 
were informed that the aim of the study was to explore natu-
ral everyday memory behavior and that it was very impor-
tant that they behaved in their usual manner, without trying 
harder than usual to remember their planned activities.
During the first telephone call 3 days after the labora-
tory session, participants were asked to recall all planned 
activities and indicate which of them they had completed 
successfully and if they used a reminder. Participants were 
then asked to nominate up to seven new intended activities 
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for the next 3 days. Their correct recall and successful per-
formance was recorded by the experimenter during a second 
phone call 3 days later. For statistical analyses, real-life PM 
performance was aggregated across the 6 days of assess-
ment. Percentages of correctly fulfilled intentions were used 
to account for differences in the overall number of planned 
intentions between participants. Reminder use and inten-
tion importance were only assessed for the first naturalistic 
and self-assigned PM tasks (study days 1–3). For statistical 
analyses, reminder use was calculated as the percentage of 
tasks for which participants reported to have used reminders. 
Importance ratings were added and divided by the number 
of tasks/intentions to obtain the average importance rating 
for each task type.
Given that the main goal of the present study was to 
test PM age differences as a function of the cue type (i.e., 
time- vs. event-based) across different settings, participants’ 
descriptions of intended activities and information provided 
on dates/times for the execution of self-assigned PM tasks 
were used to categorize these intentions into time-based (i.e., 
when the participant indicated only the date and/or time) 
and event-based PM tasks (i.e., when the participant stated 
an event irrespective whether the date or time for the inten-
tion fulfillment was indicated). This classification was based 
on the assumption that in everyday event-based tasks, par-
ticipants may often have some idea about the time frame in 
which the event may be encountered. Surprisingly, almost 
all recorded self-assigned PM tasks (99%) mentioned a date 
and/or time, but only one nominated intention description 
specified an event for the intended action (i.e., passing a 
message to a family member), which made a distinction 
into time- and event-based PM tasks not feasible. However, 
a closer look at the time-based self-assigned tasks showed 
clear differences in the specificity of the time period for car-
rying out PM tasks. In particular, four different categories 
could be identified: (1) exact date and time (e.g., Monday at 
10 am), (2) a time-window (e.g., Wednesday morning), (3) 
an entire day (e.g., Thursday) or (4) a deadline (e.g., before 
Sunday).2 The absolute numbers of self-assigned PM tasks 
within each category and the percentage of their correct ful-
fillment were used in the statistical analyses.
Procedure
All participants started with an individual session in the 
laboratory. They were informed that the study goal was to 
examine verbal abilities, memory, information processing 
and personality. After signing consent forms, they received 
instructions for all three lab-based PM tasks. At first, the 
event-based pencil and the token tasks were explained and 
participants were asked to repeat instructions in their own 
words to ensure correct understanding. After the experi-
menter was satisfied that the participant had understood 
and encoded the pencil and the token tasks, the time-based 
stop-clock task was introduced. Again, instructions had to be 
repeated by the participants and the experimenter informed 
them that the time started running by pointing to the table 
clock behind them.
All PM tasks were embedded in a series of paper–pencil 
tasks and questionnaires (see overview of the procedure in 
Table 2) that served as ongoing activities. The event-based 
PM cue sentences were part of the task instruction or the 
request to fill in a questionnaire, respectively. Specifically, 
after repeating instructions for the stop-clock task, the 
testing session began and participants were asked to fill 
in the socio-demographic questionnaire using the ‘blue 
pen’, which was the first cue for the pencil PM task (i.e., 
repeating the words ‘blue pen’ when hearing these words 
from the experimenter). Then, participants performed the 
logical memory subtask from the WMS-R that the experi-
menter introduced by saying out loud “The next task con-
cerns memory”, which was the first cue to perform the 
token PM task (i.e., giving a token to the experimenter). 
Following the logical memory subtask, participants per-
formed the Verbal Paired Associates subtask from the 
WMS-R. Participants continued with the Digit-Symbol-
Task, which was introduced by the experimenter by say-
ing “Please use the blue pen to work on the next task”, 
which was the second cue for the pencil PM task. After-
wards, participants worked on the vocabulary test. Then 
they were asked to fill in the conscientiousness subscale 
of the German translation (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) 
of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). The experimenter introduced the next task 
with the cue sentence for the token task (i.e., “the next task 
concerns memory”) and asked the participants to fill in 
the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire 
(PRMQ, Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, & Logie, 
2003). Participants had to perform the delayed recall of the 
two WMS-R subtasks afterwards. The delayed recall was 
once more introduced with the cue sentence for the third 
token task. Finally, participants were asked about their 
planned activities for the next 3 days. The experimenter 
wrote down the intentions and related dates or times for 
2 It is interesting that the categories of ‘exact date and time’, ‘time-
window’ and ‘entire day’ are identical to the categories in Ellis and 
Nimmo-Smith’s (1993) classification of time-based tasks as ‘pulses’, 
‘intermediates’ and ‘steps’, respectively.
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their planned fulfillment if specified by the participant. 
The participants then received instructions for the natural-
istic PM tasks, which they had to repeat in their own words 
to ensure correct understanding. In addition, they had to 
indicate how important these tasks were to them using a 
three-point Likert-scale (1 = less important, 2 = important, 
Table 2  Overview of lab-based testing session listing all performed activities and indicating which activity instructions comprised a PM target 
cue (for the pencil or token task, respectively) and when the time-based PM task had to be performed
PM cue
Activity Pencil Token Time
1. Signing consent form
2. Instructions for lab-based PM tasks
3. Demographics questionnaire X
4. Logical memory task X 10 min
5. Verbal paired associates memory task
6. Digit symbol test X
7. Vocabulary test 20 min
8. Conscientiousness questionnaire
9. PRMQ X
10. Delayed recall memory tasks X
11. Nomination of participants’ real life 
self-assigned intentions
12. Instructions naturalistic PM tasks
13. Request to hand over blue pen X
In the pencil task, participants were asked to repeat the words “blue pen” whenever the experimenter used them. In the token task, participants 
were asked to take a token out of a drawer whenever the instruction of a new task started with the sentence “The next task concerns memory”. In 
the time-based task, participants were asked to remember to tell the experimenter when 10 and 20 min had passed
Table 3  Overview of all 
the naturalistic tasks that 
participants had to complete 
over the 6 days following the 
lab-based testing session
Day Task type Activity
1 Time-based (1-day delay)
Event-based
Send SMS with ID at arranged time
Send SMS with ID and bus number when seeing a bus
2 Event-based Send postcard with ID and date when passing post box
3 Time-based (3-day delay) Call experimenter at agreed time
4 Time-based (1-day delay) Send SMS with ID at arranged time
6 Time-based (3-day delay) Call experimenter at agreed time
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3 = very important). The experimenter asked the partici-
pant to return the ‘blue pen’ (i.e., third cue for the pen-
cil PM task) before they left. The whole session lasted 
approximately 45 min. Although the testing session was 
self-paced, for the majority of participants the opportunity 
to perform the first time-based stop-clock task (i.e., inform 
the experimenter that 10 min had expired) occurred during 
or after the logical memory subtask (see Table 2). Simi-
larly, the second target time of 20 min occurred during or 
after the vocabulary test.
On the first day after the experimental session, partici-
pants had to remember two naturalistic PM tasks, one 1-day 
delay time-based (send a text message at a particular time) 
and one event-based (send a text message when seeing a 
bus). On the second day, participants had to remember to 
send a postcard when seeing a post box (event-based PM 
task). On the third day after the session, participants had to 
remember the 3-day delay time-based task to call the experi-
menter at the agreed time. If the participant forgot to call, 
the experimenter called him/her to ask if they used remind-
ers for the naturalistic PM tasks and to assess remember-
ing and performance of self-generated real-life PM tasks. 
Specifically, participants were asked to recall their planned 
activities. If one or several initially intended actions were not 
mentioned by the participant, the experimenter gave a gen-
eral prompt by saying that these were not all planned activi-
ties. If the participant still could not recall all intentions, the 
experimenter told him/her which ones were missing. Then 
the experimenter repeated the whole list and the participant 
indicated if each intention was performed as planned. If this 
was not the case, reasons for non-fulfillment were assessed. 
Participants were also asked for each intention if they used a 
reminder. After that the experimenter asked for the planned 
activities for the next 3 days and also gave instructions for 
two new naturalistic time-based PM tasks. The 1-day delay 
task involved sending a text message on the day following 
the phone conversation, and the 3-day delay task involved 
calling the experimenter 3 days later (see overview of all 
naturalistic PM tasks in Table 3). If the participant did not 
call on the third day at the agreed time, the experimenter 
called herself and assessed the remembering and perfor-
mance of participants’ own self-assigned real-life PM tasks 
as described above.
Results
PM performance as a function of age group, PM task 
and cue type
Participants completed several time- and event-based PM 
tasks in and outside the laboratory. To assess the overall 
pattern of the paradox for the lab-based and naturalistic PM 
tasks as a function of PM cue (event vs. time), we obtained 
single measures of laboratory and naturalistic time- and 
event-based PM by averaging scores over the observations 
and tasks. For example, the score for the laboratory time-
based task was based on the proportion of on-time responses 
after 10 and 20 min. In the naturalistic event-based task, it 
was based on the proportion of correct responses in the bus 
and the post box tasks (see Table 4).3 To derive a single 
Table 4  Mean percentages of correct PM responses (standard devia-
tions) in young and older adults as a function of laboratory PM task 
(pencil, token, and stop-clock) and naturalistic PM task (event-based 
bus and post box, time-based 1-day delay and 3-day delay)
PM task Age group
Young Old
M (SD) M (SD)
Laboratory tasks
 Event-based (pencil) 91.40 (17.14) 54.55 (34.95)
 Event-based (token) 88.17 (23.65) 56.06 (36.20)
 Time-based (stop-clock) 75.81 (36.22) 77.27 (36.93)
Naturalistic tasks
 Event-based (bus, post box) 82.26 (24.32) 93.18 (17.56)
 Time-based 1-day delay 56.45 (40.30) 81.82 (32.90)
























Fig. 1  PM performance (percentage of correct PM responses) in both 
age groups as a function of task setting and PM cue type. Error bars 
represent the standard error (SE)
3 Analyzing performance separately for the two naturalistic event-
based tasks (i.e. bus and post box task) showed the same pattern of 
results (i.e., no age differences in performance).
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measure for laboratory event-based PM and naturalistic 
time-based PM, we averaged scores across the pen and token 
tasks and 1-day and 3-day delay tasks, respectively. This was 
justified by the results of two separate 2 (age group) × 2 (type 
of task) mixed ANOVAs on laboratory event-based and 
naturalistic time-based PM tasks, respectively, that did not 
result in significant main effects of task type (e.g., pen vs. 
token) or task type by age group interactions (all Fs < 2.68).
A 2 (age group: young vs. old) × 2 (PM task: naturalistic 
vs. lab-based) × 2 (PM target cue: event- vs. time-based) 
mixed-model ANOVA was then performed on the mean 
proportions of correct PM responses (see Fig. 1). Results 
showed that the main effects of age and PM task were not 
significant (both ps ≥ .217), but the main effect of PM 
target cue was approaching significance with medium size 
effect, F (1, 51) = 3.35, p = .073, 휂2
p
 = .06. However, all 
two-way interactions between PM target cue and PM task 
[F (1, 51) = 7.39, p = .009, 휂2
p
 = .13], PM target cue and age 
[F (1, 51) = 10.76, p = .002, 휂2
p
 = .17] and age and PM task 
[F (1, 51) = 13.68, p = .001, 휂2
p
 = .21], were significant. 
Importantly, in line with predictions, these interactions 
were qualified by a marginally significant three-way inter-





Exploring the triple interaction, several follow-up analy-
ses were conducted separately for the two settings. In the 
laboratory, young adults outperformed older adults in the 
event-based PM tasks, F(1, 51) = 29.84, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .37, 
while performance in the time-based tasks did not differ 
between age groups, F < 1. In contrast, in the naturalistic PM 
tasks, older adults outperformed young adults in the time-
based tasks, F(1, 51) = 5.97, p = .018, 휂2
p
 = .11, but the age 
effect was not statistically significant for the event-based 
tasks, F(1, 51) = 3.23, p = .078, 휂2
p
 = .06.
Further follow-up analyses were performed separately 
for the two age groups. Within the young adults, PM per-
formance was significantly better for event-based than 
time-based cues (see Fig. 1). This finding was true in the 
laboratory, F(1, 30) = 4.67, p = .039, 휂2
p
 = .14, and in the 
field, F(1, 30) = 12.27, p = .001, 휂2
p
 = .29. There were no 
main effects of setting for event- or time-based PM tasks, 
both ps ≥ .174.
Within the older adults, PM performance was better for 
time-based than event-based tasks in the laboratory, F(1, 
21) = 4.76, p = .041, 휂2
p
 = .19. The opposite pattern emerged 
in the field with better performance in event-based than 
time-based tasks, F(1, 21) = 5.92, p = .024, 휂2
p
 = .22. In addi-
tion, performance was significantly better in the event-based 
PM tasks in the field compared to performance in the lab-
based tasks, F(1, 21) = 24.76, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .54, while per-
formance across settings (laboratory vs. field) was compa-
rable for time-based tasks, p = .650.
To test the robustness of this pattern of results, we con-
ducted an additional nonparametric permutation test for 
the main analysis on PM performance as a function of age 
group, PM task and PM target cue. Each permutation test 
was based on 1000 random permutations of the original 
data (Good, 2005). The results of this analysis converged 
with the pattern of findings obtained in the parametric 
ANOVA (see Table 5).
Real‑life self‑assigned PM as a function of age 
and temporal specificity
The number of planned activities in the first 3 days and the 
subsequent 3 days were added up for each participant. There 
was a trend for a higher number of self-assigned intentions 
across the 6 days in young (M = 10.36; SD = 1.42) compared 
to older adults (M = 9.70; SD = .98), F (1, 46) = 3.19, 
p = .081, 휂2
p
 = .07. Participants reported intentions such as 
arranging a foot care appointment, buying a bargain offer, 
sorting and putting holiday pictures in the photo album or 
preparing a specific meeting.
We also examined the number of planned activities as a 
function of age and temporal specificity by conducting a 2 
(age group: young vs. old) × 4 (specificity: exact date and 
time vs. time-window vs. specific day vs. deadline) mixed-
model ANOVA with the repeated measures on the second 
factor. Results showed a significant main effect of specificity, 
F (3, 129) = 30.50, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .42. The main effect of age 
and the specificity by age interaction was not significant, 
Fs < 1. Both young and older adults mainly indicated to have 
set themselves intentions with certain time-windows (e.g., 
Monday evening) rather than intentions with the precise time 
and date (e.g., 8:00 pm on Monday) or less specific inten-
tions involving a particular day or a deadline (see Table 6).
Next, age differences in remembering real-life self-
assigned PM tasks were examined for all the nominated 
intentions and as a function of temporal specificity. Results 
Table 5  Results of nonparametric permutation test on PM perfor-
mance as a function of age group, PM task and PM target cue
Effect F p
Age group .07 .795
PM task .32 .580
PM target cue 4.93 .026
Age group × cue 10.76 .002
Age group × task 13.68 < .001
Cue × task 5.52 .021
Age group × cue × task 3.94 .051
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of a one-way ANOVA for all nominated intentions showed 
that young (M = 81.55; SD = 10.93) and older participants 
(M = 85.01; SD = 13.78) did not differ significantly in the 
percentage of correctly performed intentions, F (1, 43) = .88, 
p = .354, 휂2
p
 = .02. Considering real-life PM performance as 
a function of temporal specificity, separate ANOVAs were 
run comparing the percentage of fulfilled intentions in young 
and older adults for each specificity category (i.e., exact date 
and time, time-window, specific day, deadline).4 To avoid an 
inflated type I error rate, the alpha level was set at .013 
according to the number of performed tests (i.e., 
.05/4 = .013). There was a trend for better performance in 
the older adults for self-assigned PM tasks with an exact date 
and time reported during encoding with a large effect size, 
F (1, 20) = 5.06, p = .036, 휂2
p
 = .20 (see Table 6). No other 
comparisons approached significance, all Fs < 1.
The role of perceived importance in naturalistic 
and self‑assigned PM tasks
Perceived importance was measured for each naturalistic 
PM task and each self-assigned intention during the first 
three study days by asking participants how important they 
rated each of them using a three-point Likert-scale (1 = less 
important, 2 = important, 3 = very important). These rat-
ings were then added and divided by the number of tasks/
intentions to obtain the average importance rating for each 
task type. Table 7 (upper panel) shows the mean impor-
tance ratings and the results of one-way between-subjects 
ANOVAs for naturalistic PM tasks (both event- and time-
based) and for self-assigned tasks overall and with the date 
and time specified at encoding. No significant age effects 
were obtained (all Fs <2.62), except for event-based natu-
ralistic PM tasks, which were rated as more important by 
older adults (M = 2.14, SD = .48) than young participants 
(M = 1.74, SD = .51).
The role of reminder use in naturalistic 
and self‑assigned PM tasks
For each naturalistic PM task and each self-assigned inten-
tion during the first three study days, participants were asked 
if they used a reminder to remember them. The percentage 
of tasks for which a reminder was used was then calculated 
for each task type (e.g., if a reminder was used for one of 
the two event-based naturalistic tasks, reminder use was 
determined as 50%). Table 7 (lower panel) shows the mean 
percentages of reminder use in young and older adults as a 
function of PM task and the results of one-way ANOVAs on 
these means. No significant age effects emerged for any of 
the naturalistic PM tasks. Further, no significant age effects 
were obtained for real-life self-assigned PM tasks either 
overall or for intentions with the date and time specified at 
encoding. It is interesting that for self-assigned tasks’ par-
ticipants reported using reminders for a very small percent-
age of intentions (between 0 and 13%).
Discussion
Despite some progress in research on the age–PM-paradox 
over the past decade, there are several unanswered questions 
not only in terms of the exact pattern of the paradox for 
time- and event-based tasks, but also in terms of potential 
variables that are critical in determining the direction of age 
effects in and outside the laboratory (Phillips et al., 2008). 
The aim of the present study was to re-examine the precise 
pattern of the paradox for time- and event-based PM tasks 
by studying, for the first time, possible age differences in 
lab-based, naturalistic and self-generated real-life PM tasks 
Table 6  Mean number and range of planned intentions (standard deviations in brackets) and percentages of fulfilled self-assigned real-life PM 
tasks in both age groups as a function of cue specificity
For percentage of fulfilled intentions, the number of participants who reported at least one intention in the particular specificity category is 
reported
Young adults Older adults
Date and time Time-window Specific day Deadline Date and time Time-window Specific day Deadline
Number of inten-
tions
1.74 (2.14) 5.81 (3.70) 1.33 (1.96) 1.19 (2.30) .83 (1.34) 6.33 (2.83) 2.11 (2.40) 1.00 (2.11)



















4 The data set did not allow running a mixed ANOVA, because the 
dependent variable was not a repeated measure in the usual sense. 
Thus, participants were not asked to form intentions with cues of 
various specificity. Instead, they reported all their daily intentions and 
indicated if they planned to carry them out in relation to an event, 
time or date. As a result, not all participants reported each of the four 
different types of intentions (see Table 5).
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within the same sample of young and older adults. Our main 
prediction was that a standard pattern of the age–PM-para-
dox reported in previous studies for time-based tasks would 
not be obtained for event-based tasks. In other words, while 
we expected negative age effects in the laboratory, we pre-
dicted positive age effects outside the laboratory only for 
naturalistic time-based but not for event-based tasks. With 
regards to self-assigned PM tasks, we expected that the pat-
tern of findings would mimic the one obtained for naturalis-
tic PM tasks with no age effects for event- but positive age 
effects for time-based tasks.
Several novel findings emerged. In line with predictions, 
no statistically reliable age benefit was found for naturalistic 
event-based PM tasks, as performance scores of young and 
older participants did not differ from each other. In con-
trast, standard (and very large) negative age effects were 
obtained for laboratory event-based tasks. This finding 
replicates numerous previous laboratory studies on event-
based PM. In addition, the pattern of negative age effects 
in the lab and the absence of age effects in naturalistic PM 
tasks is identical with the initial results of Kvavilashvili 
et al. (2013) and Niedźwieńska and Barzykowski (2012), 
who also compared the event-based PM performance with 
lab-based and naturalistic tasks in one sample of young and 
older participants. This consistency of results on event-based 
PM tasks across studies using different tasks and materials 
instills confidence in the conclusion that age benefits found 
for naturalistic time-based tasks do not generalize to natu-
ralistic event-based tasks.
In contrast to the absence of age effects on naturalistic 
event-based PM, a significant age benefit was found for 
naturalistic time-based tasks. This replicates the findings of 
previous studies on-time-based PM where participants had 
to remember to carry out the same task several times over an 
extended period of time (once a day or even several times a 
day). Our findings extend the results of previous studies by 
showing that positive age effect was present even when par-
ticipants were given single rather than repeated time-based 
tasks over 1- and 3-day delay intervals.
However, somewhat unexpected findings emerged for par-
ticipants’ own self-assigned PM tasks. First, the examination 
of the content of nominated intentions did not describe tasks 
involving event-based cues and most PM tasks were clearly 
time-based with varying degree of specificity in terms of 
when the task was to be carried out (see also Ellis, 1988; 
Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). Second, when age effects 
were examined for reported fulfillment of these self-assigned 
time-based intentions, no age effect emerged in contrast to 
positive age effects on experimenter-assigned time-based 
tasks. When PM performance for these tasks was examined 
as a function of temporal specificity, there was a trend for 
better performance in older compared to young adults for 
highly specific intentions with a clear date and time planned 
for the fulfillment.
Taken together, these findings both replicate and signifi-
cantly extend existing research on the paradox by providing 
strong support for the idea that the age benefits with natu-
ralistic and self-assigned PM tasks documented in previous 
research may have been overestimated due to the dominant 
use of only those naturalistic time-based PM tasks, in which 
the time and date are clearly specified. Consequently, we 
propose to consider redefining the pattern of the age–PM-
paradox as consisting of mostly negative age effects in lab-
based PM tasks and mostly the absence of negative age 
effects (rather than age benefits) in naturalistic tasks out-
side the laboratory. The latter is clearly the case for event-
based tasks and also for time-based tasks with less temporal 
Table 7  Mean importance 
ratings and reminder use 
(standard deviations) in young 
and older adults for event- and 
time-based naturalistic PM 
tasks, self-assigned intentions 
overall, self-assigned intentions 
with date and time specified, 
and results of one-way 
ANOVAs
Importance was measured using a three-point Likert-scale (1 = less important, 2 = important, 3 = very 
important). Reminder use was measured as the percentage of tasks for which participants reported to have 
used reminders
PM Task Age group
Young Old F p 휂2
p
M (SD) M (SD)
Importance
 Naturalistic event-based 1.74 (.51) 2.14 (.48) 7.04 .011 .14
 Naturalistic time-based 1.93 (.55) 2.18 (.39) 2.62 .113 .056
 Self-assigned (overall) 2.11 (.36) 2.15 (.43) .12 .728 .002
 Self-assigned date and time 2.17 (.58) 2.11 (.43) .06 .806 .003
Reminder use
 Naturalistic event-based 67.86 (51.31) 52.78 (49.92) .97 .331 .02
 Naturalistic time-based 51.92 (47.9) 36.11 (44.74) 1.22 .275 .028
 Self-assigned (overall) 12.28 (22.23) 12.67 (28.7) .003 .956 .000
 Self-assigned date and time 13.33 (35.31) 0 (0) 1.12 .301 .05
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specificity as demonstrated by the findings on participants’ 
own self-assigned time-based intentions.
Additional findings concerning possible mechanisms 
underlying the age benefits, observed for some of the natu-
ralistic tasks in the present study, do not support the wide-
spread view that age differences in perceived task impor-
tance and reminder use play key roles in this context (cf. 
Phillips et al., 2008). Indeed, the only age difference in 
importance ratings for naturalistic tasks was observed for 
event-based ones, and here, PM performance did not differ 
between young and older adults. No age differences for per-
ceived importance and reminder use for the time-based natu-
ralistic tasks emerged, although these were the PM tasks in 
which age benefits were observed. Our results therefore add 
to the growing number of studies suggesting that age differ-
ences in reminder use cannot explain the age–PM-paradox, 
although intuitively it seems like a plausible argument (Ihle 
et al., 2012; Maylor, 1990; Patton & Meit, 1993; Rendell 
& Craik, 2000; Rendell & Thomson, 1999; West, 1988). 
For example, Niedźwieńska and Barzykowski (2012) also 
showed that reminder use did not explain the presence and 
absence of age benefits in time- and event-based naturalis-
tic tasks, respectively. In addition, while Niedźwieńska and 
Barzykowski (2012) showed that a higher commitment to 
perform the naturalistic tasks in the older adults (which can 
be interpreted as a measure of motivation) was associated 
with age benefits, this factor did not differ as a function of 
PM cue type. Therefore, although higher motivation to per-
form PM tasks in everyday life may be beneficial in general, 
this factor does not seem to explain the performance differ-
ences observed in naturalistic PM as a function of cue type.
Future research should focus on factors that are more 
closely related to specific challenges of each task type, for 
example, adhering to a specific target time. One possible 
candidate could be age differences in the structure and num-
ber of routine activities which may be higher in older adults 
and which may make it easier to implement PM tasks in gen-
eral and convert time-based into event-based tasks or vice 
versa (Maylor, 1990; Rendell & Craik, 2000). The trend for a 
higher number of planned intentions in the young compared 
to the older adults, observed in the present study, may sug-
gest that young adults are generally busier, which may make 
a timely execution of additional tasks in one’s everyday 
life more challenging. In line with this, previous research 
showed that young adults reported being more stressed in 
their everyday life compared to older adults (Schnitzspahn 
et al., 2011) and that higher levels of self-reported stress 
were negatively related to naturalistic PM (Ihle et al., 2012).
Recent findings by Niedźwieńska et al. (2013) suggest 
that better PM performance of older adults in naturalistic PM 
tasks can be partly explained by better planning. More pre-
cisely, older adults displayed a better temporal organization 
of their self-assigned real-life PM tasks and specified more 
clearly when they would be fulfilled. These results raise the 
possibility that older adults may be more likely than young 
adults to use detailed and effective plans to implement their 
intentions, especially for time-based tasks. In the present 
study, older adults did not form more self-assigned PM tasks 
with highly defined temporal cues than young adults, but 
they performed these intentions especially well with a trend 
for better performance compared with the young adults. This 
finding further supports the idea that older adults benefit 
from precisely planned intentions in their everyday life and 
that cue specificity may be an important factor underlying 
the age benefit usually found for time-based PM tasks out-
side of the laboratory.
While young adults seem to struggle to perform natural-
istic time-based PM tasks at specific time points predefined 
by the experimenter, overall, there was no age effect on self-
assigned time-based task performance. Given that young and 
older adults mainly indicated to have set themselves inten-
tions with certain time-windows instead of intentions that 
had to be executed at a precise time and date, young adults 
had more flexibility performing these tasks compared to the 
naturalistic time-based PM tasks. This greater flexibility may 
have enabled young adults to fulfill their intentions more 
easily according to their (rather vague) plans despite poten-
tially higher stress levels and poorer time management skills.
At first glance, it may seem surprising that we observed 
age impairments in event-based, but not time-based labora-
tory PM tasks. Time-based tasks lack an external event that 
indicates the appropriate moment to initiate the intended 
action and therefore are assumed to require more self-initi-
ated processing (e.g., monitoring of the time; Einstein et al., 
1995; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). However, in line with 
our findings, the meta-analysis by Henry et al. (2004) could 
not confirm the widespread assumption that time-based PM 
tasks produce larger age effects than event-based ones for 
lab-based and naturalistic tasks. At this point, it is difficult to 
offer a theoretical explanation of these findings, as research 
on-time-based PM is limited and specific theories are miss-
ing. Although the influential multiprocess model focuses on 
event-based PM, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) indicated 
that aspects of this theory may be relevant to time-based 
tasks as well. For example, time-based PM may also depend 
on spontaneous or controlled processes as a function of task 
characteristics, such as ongoing task difficulty, the time-win-
dow for responding, the ease with which the elapsed time 
can be monitored, etc.
While the ongoing laboratory activities used in the pre-
sent study were attentionally demanding (i.e., different 
memory and intelligence tests and questionnaires), they 
also offered opportunities for breaks between different tasks 
that might have been used for rehearsal and clock checking. 
Further, they did not require any motoric coordination for 
pressing different keys on the keyboard (i.e., to carry out 
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the ongoing task, PM task and to check the clock), which 
older participants sometimes struggle with when completing 
computerized PM tasks. It is noteworthy that Niedźwieńska 
and Barzykowski (2012), who used a similar time-based 
PM task in the lab with comparable ongoing activities (i.e., 
performing different memory and intelligence tasks and rat-
ing restaurant descriptions), also did not find any age differ-
ence. Finally, in event-based tasks, the appearance of a target 
event is unpredictable while in laboratory time-based tasks, 
estimating the elapsed time is under participants’ control 
as they can decide when to check the time. In line with this 
argument, several studies have shown that event-based tasks 
had more detrimental effects on performance in the ongoing 
task than time-based tasks (e.g., Park et al., 1997; Trawley, 
Stephens, Rendell, & Groeger, 2017).
In sum, these findings cast some doubts on the assump-
tion that time-based tasks are always attentionally more 
demanding than event-based tasks (see also Kvavilashvili 
& Fisher, 2007), and suggest that more targeted investi-
gation of this question is necessary. Conceptually, these 
investigations could be based on a recent extension of the 
multiprocess model of PM (Scullin et al., 2013; Shelton & 
Scullin, 2017), as it offers a broader theoretical framework 
that can be applied to both event- and time-based tasks. This 
dynamic multiprocess view suggests an interplay between 
spontaneous and controlled processes within the same PM 
task. Future research should examine how the type of PM 
task and the setting in which it is completed may moder-
ate the suggested dynamic interaction between bottom-up, 
spontaneous and top-down, controlled processes supporting 
time-based PM.
The distinction between time- and event-based tasks is 
well established in PM research. The current finding that 
the pattern of the age–PM-paradox needs to be reconsidered 
as a function of the cue type (i.e., time- vs. event-based) 
underlines the usefulness of this distinction. Indeed, both 
task types seem to measure related, but distinct abilities that 
can be differentially influenced by age and thus should be 
considered separately. However, the fact that the participants 
in the present study reported hardly any self-assigned inten-
tions related to a specific environmental cue, event or situa-
tion, and instead planned the fulfillment of their intentions 
in relation to a more or less specific point in time depicts 
an interesting finding in itself and is in line with a previous 
diary study (Holbrook & Dismukes, 2009) that also reported 
a remarkable absence of event-based PM tasks and a clear 
prevalence of time-based PM tasks in daily life. These find-
ings might question the usefulness of the distinction into 
time- and event-based PM tasks in everyday life.5 In line 
with this observation, Dismukes (2012) suggested that the 
categories of event-based and time-based PM do not cap-
ture the range of situations in which individuals perform 
intended actions in their everyday lives and therefore a clear 
categorization can be very difficult. More research is needed 
to verify which types of PM tasks people actually face in 
their everyday lives. In any case, the marked dominance 
of self-assigned time-based intentions in the present study 
underlines the importance of this task type from an applied 
perspective. Accordingly, PM research in and outside of the 
laboratory should focus more on-time-based PM and define 
different variants within this task type depending on tem-
poral specificity, regularity or length of delay. In addition, 
future research should also focus on-time-based tasks that 
come up during the day rather than being intended well in 
advance (e.g., when calling someone and being asked to call 
back in an hour). So far, only Rendell and Craik (2000, study 
2) investigated such ‘crop up’ naturalistic time-based tasks 
(referred to as ‘time-check’ tasks), and found no significant 
age effect between young and old–old participants, but both 
groups performed reliably worse than young-old partici-
pants. The latter finding also underscores the importance 
of having young–old and old–old participants in studies on 
the age–PM-paradox, which was one of the limitations of 
the present study.
Another possible limitation involved the design of natu-
ralistic event-based PM tasks, as the possibility that some 
participants did not perform the tasks just because the 
opportunity to encounter the PM cue (i.e., pass a post box 
or see a bus) was missing, cannot be ruled out completely. 
However, all participants lived in a big city with a high num-
ber of post boxes and buses in their everyday environment, 
and stated going out on a daily basis, which should have 
reduced the chances of this occurring, and none of the par-
ticipants reported informally that this was the cause of their 
forgetting.
Given that older adults in our study owned a mobile 
phone and were proficient in sending text messages, it is 
possible that we recruited a sample of highly function-
ing older adults who were not representative of the gen-
eral population, especially of adults in their late 70 s and 
80 s. However, the use of mobile phones is increasingly 
becoming a norm across the world in both young and older 
adults. Moreover, older participants in the present study 
were showing large cognitive declines in the standard lab-
oratory tasks of fluid intelligence and episodic memory 
5 It is important to point out that the absence of event-based inten-
tions in participants’ self-assigned PM tasks was not due to the 
assessment method (i.e., by asking participants to indicate a possi-
ble time frame for nominated intentions). Indeed, participants could 
describe an event-based task (e.g., pass on a message to a friend) 
and then indicate an approximate time frame when this event could 
be encountered (e.g., tomorrow). However, there was absence of such 
events in participants’ descriptions, indicating that in everyday life 
perhaps people form event-based intentions less frequently than time-
based intentions. For example, an intention to pass on a message was 
only described by one participant on one occasion.
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(see Table 1), but these deficits did not seem to influence 
their performance on naturalistic and self-assigned PM 
tasks. Old–old adults (over 75 years of age) would prob-
ably show stronger and more consistent PM impairments 
in the laboratory than in the present sample, while they 
might still perform comparably to young adults in the field 
(e.g., Kvavilashvili et al., 2013; Rendell & Craik, 2000; 
Rendell & Thomson, 1999).
In summary, results of the present study provide impor-
tant insights into the precise pattern of the age–PM-paradox. 
In particular, the results showed that the previously docu-
mented superiority of older adults in remembering natural-
istic PM tasks could be due to the use of time-based tasks 
with high temporal specificity, and that positive age effects 
outside the laboratory disappear when event-based tasks 
are used (cf. Niedźwieńska & Barzykowski, 2012). This 
differential pattern of age effects in naturalistic event- and 
time-based PM tasks calls for more targeted and fine-grained 
investigation of potential underlying mechanisms of these 
age effects in future studies.
The finding that there may be no age effects outside the 
laboratory for naturalistic and self-assigned real-life PM 
tasks, does not reduce the importance of the re-defined 
age–PM-paradox for research in cognitive aging and its 
practical implications. Indeed, the finding that older adults 
can function cognitively as well as young adults in everyday 
life while displaying substantial deficits in laboratory PM 
tasks and other cognitive tasks measuring speed of process-
ing, working memory and long-term memory (Park, Polk, 
Mikels, Taylor, & Marshuetz, 2001), is important not only 
theoretically, but also practically due to popular culture and 
prevailing beliefs that cognitive functions significantly dete-
riorate in old age. Although the age–PM-paradox has been 
suggested to be unique to PM and not extend to retrospec-
tive memory in general (Phillips et al., 2008), latest findings 
reported in the retrospective memory literature on flashbulb 
memories (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine, & 
Kornbrot, 2010), memories for incidental stimuli in the 
environment (Qin et al., 2014) and involuntary autobio-
graphical memories (Berntsen et al., 2017; Kvavilashvili, 
Niedźwieńska, & Kliegel, 2016), to name the few, suggest 
that the absence of age effects for naturalistic tasks may be 
more widespread than previously thought.
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